Primary Field: Comparative Politics
Secondary Field: Political Theory
PhD expected June 2017
Dissertation Committee Composition
Matthew S. Shugart (Chair), James Adams and Ethan Scheiner
My research interests mainly cover how formal institutions, especially electoral systems and executive structures, affect policy outcomes and democratic performance, with special attentions paid to applied theories in institutional design that built on scholars such as Taagepera, Lijphart and Shugart.
My dissertation, Multiparism and the “Beauty of Cycling”: Explaining Minorities' Bargaining Power under Majority Rule>, connects social choice theories with the comparative studies of party systems and addresses two long established but insufficiently answered questions in political science: First, why do the losers of the electoral games receive more distributive benefits in some democracies than in others? And second, in countries where distributions are highly biased against the minorities, does there exist an effective institutional solution? It first advances a theory on the relationship between minority protection and the defection costs from the winning coalition and tests it with a novel online rational choice experiment. It then makes the argument that parliamentarism and proportional representation just by themselves can reduce the defection costs and supports it with an analysis of an original vote share data.
Dissertation: "Multiparism and the “Beauty of Cycling”: Explaining Minorities' Bargaining Power under Majority Rule"